On European Defense: Stop Debating, Act.
I recently had the honor of participating in a French radio program discussing European defense and whether Macron was right. Some smart things were said, at least by the other participants. Among them was the idea that Europe was in a race against time, which is true. In other ways, I found the conversation frustrating just as I find so much of the debate about European defense frustrating.
Too much of the debate—far too much—is about the European Union versus NATO, or whether French leadership was appropriate or even helpful. Too little is focused on concrete action. Indeed, there has been remarkably little action of any sort.
The Munich Security Conference: Because what Europe needs is more talk.
Let’s lay out the issues:
1. Europeans collectively spend too little and have too few military capabilities. Yes, they’ve grown too comfortable living under American security guarantees for over 70 years, and they understandably saw the end of the Cold War as an opportunity to relax even more. It is true that collectively they spend a lot and that a large part of the problem is the inefficiency that comes with redundancy and not sufficiently pooling resources, but that cannot be an excuse for not spending more.
2. Each European military power assumes that they would only go to war as part of a broader coalition. That’s true. But regrettably, the idea has served as an excuse for the larger military powers to skimp on certain capabilities. They comfort themselves with the idea that whatever capabilities they lack can be provided by someone else. This is reasonable, but at the same time, they have put themselves in a situation wherein they all are counting on someone else to fill their gaps, and one must wonder how plausible that is if each one of them makes the same assumption. It’s like being invited to a pot-luck dinner and assuming that someone else will provide the main courses, so everyone shows up with maybe a salad or a dessert. Also, the only country that might have the excess capacity to fill out everyone’s missing capacities is the United States. Does that work in reality? What if the United States doesn’t show up?
The Ukraine war has put this problem in stark relief. It has revealed that everyone, even possibly the United States, lacks some capabilities in adequate quantities, even if they have those capabilities. Some of these are new capabilities, such as drones. Others are old ones that have been neglected, for various reasons. These include air defenses, electronic warfare, and long-range heavy artillery. The United States has far more of these things available, but not necessarily enough for its own purposes, especially considering the war in Ukraine. Assuming that the U.S. can simply backfill whatever the Europeans are missing is even more risky.
3. Jean-Dominique Merchet highlighted in his recent book, Sommes-nous prêts pour la guerre? (Are we ready for war?), which I reviewed for Wavell Room, the fact that France has so disinvested from the necessary industrial capacity that there is little likelihood that it can sustain a fight of any length. Everything Merchet says about France is even more true of the rest of Europe. Thus, for example, not only do France, Germany, Italy, etc. not have enough tanks, but they are not capable of replacing the ones they have. None produces new tanks; none can any time soon. Likewise, they cannot provide Ukraine with enough arms and ammunition, like 155mm shells. That means they cannot provide themselves with enough. And these days, they have to do both, i.e. supply Ukraine AND build up their own stocks. That’s not possible so long as they lack the required industrial capacity. Indeed, what they need is excess capacity, which is anathema to cost cutters and MBAs. This matters. According to a recent report in the Economist, “the continent’s arms firms complain that their order books remain too thin to warrant big investments in production lines.” This is astounding to read in February 2024.
4. All the conversations tend to exclude Great Britain. This is a mistake; they need Great Britain, and Great Britain will need them.
5. Poland matters a great deal, as Poland currently is on its way to having NATO’s largest land force. Poland should be included in all conversations.
6. Thus far conversations about European defense tend to alienate someone, either because they do not like the French, don’t trust the Germans, or are suspicious of talk that risks weakening NATO or perhaps alienating the United States. Yet someone has to stand up and lead. The French have been offering, and frankly are the best candidates for the job. But Macron’s efforts in that direction tend to grate, rightly or wrongly. He must improve his communications game. Also, however, Europeans would be wise to get over it.
What about NATO versus the European Union? Both are necessary. NATO’s most important contribution has been in terms of establishing standards, facilitating interoperability, and, generally speaking, making it possible for forces from multiple countries to act effectively together. What NATO does not do, and what the EU should do, is focus on the industrial side and also badgering member nations into submitting to some form of arbitration regarding who builds what, and where. NATO does not do industrial policy. The EU can. Thus, a division of labor emerges.
Should the EU develop its own command and control capabilities and substitutes for NATO’s political organs? No. That would be wasteful, and also beside the point. Better to focus now on developing capabilities and industrial capacity while making the most of all NATO has to offer in terms of interoperability. If and when the time comes when Europeans have to fight alone, their ability to do so already will have been enhanced simply by having greater capabilities. They will have officers capable of doing high-level staff work, etc., thanks to NATO.
Should Europe have its own military? Maybe one day. The problem is that now, given the small size of European militaries, any troops or planes or whatever earmarked for EU-flagged operations are the same as those earmarked for everything else. EU forces are not in addition to national or NATO forces. They simply are drawn from the same paltry reservoir of existing resources. The best example is the Franco-German brigade. The French and German components are not separate from the French and German armies; they do not exist in addition to the French and German armies. They are just part of the same pool maintained by the French and Germans and are counted as such. Likewise, the NATO forces involved in air patrolling in the Baltics and Iceland are not a separate force. If Italy deploys 4 Eurofighters to Iceland, those are 4 less than it can deploy elsewhere. Remember, Italy only has about 40 of them, and as is the case with every air force, only some of those 40 are operational at any given time while the others are being serviced. Any EU command headquarters must be staffed with the same people who otherwise would be working at NATO command headquarters, institutions like the Rapid Reaction Corps in Lille, France. Leave them there.
Presently, there are too many political and cultural divisions among NATO allies to make a single military make sense. Heavyweights like France, Germany, and Britain have different ideas about when to use force and how. From those differences cascade other differences such as different views on how to organize forces, the doctrine to be used, and the equipment to procure. France, for example, has always emphasized speed and maneuverability and prioritized expeditionary capabilities. Germany has done the opposite. Perhaps, over time, this will narrow, but only over time. Also, France (and Britain) still have global ambitions, and France still has vestiges of its empire to deal with, like its territories in the Indian Ocean. Most of the rest of NATO does not.
And now for something heretical for an American to say: Europeans should stop buying American kit, or do so only to fill immediate requirements in the short term. An example of the latter case is the French decision to buy U.S.-made MQ-9 Reapers: Paris only did this because 1) it needed them, and 2) French and European efforts to produce something comparable had failed. As for, say, the F-35, while it might be all that and a bag of chips, in truth, none of the things that purportedly make it so superior to top-tier last-gen fighters like the Rafale have been proven. Maybe the Israelis know. But all the talk about giving Ukraine old F-16s and Mirage 2000s suggests that the very very best on the market might not be necessary, especially if the very very best comes at a price that keeps them in short supply. Meanwhile, Europe can make its own 5th and 6th generation fighters if it wants, but only by ensuring that companies like Dassault and Airbus Defense remain in business. I don’t have the numbers at my fingertips, but I believe it to be true that buying one’s own military hardware helps ensure that defense spending is not a waste of resources but is instead an investment and a source of income for many people. Yet, it puts money in the pockets of defense contractors, but they pay taxes, shop in grocery stores, buy houses, send their kids to daycare, etc. Buying someone else’s weapons means one is spending money with zero benefit to one’s economy. I still fail to understand why the EU did not finance a huge Saab Gripen buy for Ukraine.
Ultimately, the message for Europeans is quite simple: Act.