Can one deter the undeterrable?
Deterring the Undeterrable
Deterrence theory is a vast subject backed by a library studded with the work of some of the heaviest-weight intellectuals of the past century, including Raymond Aron, General André Beaufre, Bernard Brodie, Herman Kahn, and Thomas Schelling. It all boils down to this basic definition from Dr. Strangelove, pointed out by Al Mauroni in an excellent article on deterrence: “Deterrence is the art of producing in the mind of the enemy the fear to attack.”
Peter Sellers at his very best
Most of the theorizing on the topic has concerned nuclear weapons, which made deterrence easy to understand. One is readily deterred by nuclear weapons given their massively destructive power. Moreover—and this is critical—deterrence theory usually assumes that the actors concerned are “rational,” or irrational to a reasonable degree. We assumed (correctly) that Soviet leadership was not crazy, or at least not so crazy as to risk the destruction of the Soviet Union’s cities. We assume the same thing about contemporary Russian leadership. We are less certain about North Korea or even Iran, but probably will go with the rational actor theory for lack of any real alternative.
But what if the party one wishes to deter fundamentally does not care about the pain it risks having inflicted upon it? What if it rejoices in the pain? Or, what if it welcomes the pain because it serves its strategy?
I can think of three categories of the potentially undeterrable. The first category consists of those who are insensitive to the pain in question, or perhaps to the pain that we imagine might deter them. Stalin after the German invasion in World War II arguably cared very little about the suffering of his people or his troops; he was willing to sacrifice millions. Putin (and the Russian public) appears to take Russia’s staggering losses in Ukraine in stride. China has a long history of engaging in wars with mind-blowingly large human tolls: The number of people killed in the Taipei Rebellion is measured in the tens of millions. More recently, American firepower did not faze the Chinese army in the Korean War, and China’s willingness to accept horrific casualties in a hypothetical assault on Taiwan might surprise us. I’ve often wondered if during the Cold War the possibility of losing a few cities to American or Russian nuclear weapons really concerned Chinese leaders. Another example that comes to mind is the conduct of the Imperial Japanese military in World War II, which was more than willing to do things that would give other militaries pause because its masochism matched its sadism. Moreover, according to some of the testimonies in the excellent Japan at War: An Oral History, at least some Japanese were well aware that attacking the United States at Pearl Harbor was suicidal. If anything they reveled in the insanity of the leap into the abyss.
The Japanese example brings us to the category of those who rejoice in the prospect of death. I believe this is what is meant when people refer to a group as a “death cult.” It results from so glorifying the prospect of death for a cause that the threat of death, rather than deter, is perceived as an opportunity to be seized. The obvious contemporary examples are jihadist groups that preach the glory of martyrdom. Hamas is just one example. Many of its followers and members, including its leaders, not only might shrug their shoulders at the risk of violent death but rejoice in its prospect.
The third category consists of those for whom the prospect of devastating violence serves their strategic interests. Hamas again is a prime example: Hamas clearly welcomes Israeli violence against Palestinian civilians because the spectacle strengthens it while weakening the Israeli side. Thus, on October 7 it started a war against a militarily superior force it knew full well would respond with massive force, without doing anything to protect the civilians it knew would suffer as a result. It has, as far as I know, not opened its vast tunnel network to civilians seeking shelter. It has not laid in provisions to feed people in the event of a siege. It has sought to discourage people from getting out of the Israeli army’s way. Hamas knows that the more Gazans suffer, the stronger it becomes, and the greater the pressure on Israel to let up. Hamas wants Israel to commit genocide, and it and its allies (including legions of useful idiots) do what they can to accuse it of genocide even if Israel’s actions fail to meet the definition in the eyes of any sensible and impartial observer. Hamas may be cynical. Evil, even. But the strategic logic is sound. Think of it as a form of asymmetrical warfare.
So what is one to do?
Many of the arguments made in favor of Israel’s military operations, including my own, have pointed to the need to “restore deterrence.” Part of the argument is that Hamas was undeterred from attacking on October 7 because it bet Israel would not launch major ground operations. Why might Hamas think this? Because Israel repeatedly has pulled its punches and stopped short of a full-on ground offensive, just as it stopped short in its 2006 war against Hezbollah (another death cult happy to have its own and the people ostensibly under its protection be killed). Unfortunately, it is not at all clear that one can “restore deterrence” in the case of an adversary that is immune to deterrence for the reasons stated above.
Here are four options, none of them good:
1. Abandon deterrence as a strategic concept. If Hamas cannot be deterred, stop trying. The clear advantage would be a cessation of military operations intended to instill deterrence such as bombings likely to hurt civilians. But then what? It suggests an entirely passive and defensive strategy. Iron Dome already plays this role by negating a portion of Hamas’s offensive capabilities, but Iron Dome solves nothing, really, if Hamas will just keep trying again and again. Also, Iron Dome has made Israel overly comfortable with the idea that it can manage the threat Hamas represents rather than end that threat. October 7 proved that does not work.
The argument often is made that Israel can do the most harm to Hamas by breathing life into the promise of a Two State Solution and investing in the success of Palestinian alternatives to Hamas, namely the Palestinian Authority. I believe this should be done no matter what, but it is naïve to think this will remove the threat represented by Hamas in the immediate or medium term. One still needs to ensure that Hamas will not and cannot attempt more October 7s, as its leadership clearly has said it will. Hamas, moreover, is uninterested in negotiated political solutions. Its end game is clear (the destruction of Israel and genocide). One can and should strive to drain support for it, slowly, but the group itself will not moderate its objectives. I also believe strongly that the “just make concessions and that will fix everything” crowd greatly overestimates the extent to which Israel’s policies drive the conflict. For many, the issue isn’t Israel’s policies but rather Israel’s existence.
2. Focus on hurting Hamas by going after its leaders and card-carrying members. The argument here is that perhaps top Hamas officials value their own skin even if they are utterly indifferent to that of the people in whose name they act. Precisely targeting Hamas’s leaders, wherever they might be, seems just, and of course, it has the great benefit of reducing the potential for “collateral damage.” However, one also must wonder if it works given Hamas leaders’ and Hamas members’ professed fondness for martyrdom (death cult). After all, has not Israel been precisely doing this for years, with no clear effect? Moreover, history has shown that Israel’s critics who today insist that Israel precisely take out Hamas leaders while bending over backwards to spare civilians often are disingenuous. They are equally critical of Israel’s targeted attacks, and there is no number of civilian casualties they consider acceptable. If Israel kills 100 or 10,000 civilians, they are equally vociferous in their protests, and equally willing to fling about the “genocide” charge.
3. Never mind Hamas, go after the state sponsors, in this case Qatar and above-all Iran. That option is fraught with risk, namely the gun Iran holds to Israel’s head in the form of Hezbollah, and Iran’s wide array of proxies throughout the region. Iran also has a taste for international terrorism, as demonstrated amply when it twice bombed Buenos Aires, not to mention its penchant for hostage-taking and blowing up embassies. This does not mean that threatening Iran cannot work and should not be considered. It only means that it represents a dangerous gamble. As for Qatar, I frankly do not understand why that country is treated as courteously as it is.
4. Damn the torpedoes. Meaning, try to end the problem by going after Hamas regardless of the price to be paid, which unfortunately means inflicting serious harm to Palestinian civilians. I believe that demonstrating a willingness to do this might be the only way of defusing Hamas’s own form of deterrence, which is the risk it poses to Israel in the form of military casualties and reputational damage. This makes sense only if Israel really is prepared to go the distance and destroy Hamas in Gaza. A worse-case scenario might be that Israel begins and then is forced to stop because of international and especially American pressure. This would represent a clear victory for Hamas, and proof that its own strategy of holding Gazans hostage works.
Prior to October 7, I argued that perhaps Israel should best respond to Hamas’s endless firing of missiles against Israeli communities by not responding at all. After all, what Hamas wanted was for Israel to bomb things and thereby kill civilians, so it could parade the dead before the international community. October 7 made inaction impossible. Unfortunately, Hamas knew that. It might not be possible to restore deterrence if none existed in the first place. Perhaps the best one can do is to avoid doing anything that has the opposite effect: Encourage Hamas to keep at it. An imposed ceasefire now would do that.
Some of my favorite reading on deterrence:
General André Beaufre on Deterrence and Strategy.
Bernard Brodie’s classic Strategy in the Missile Age.
This book on the Taipei Rebellion is amazing. The best argument one can find regarding why one must never fight a land war in Asia, or at least not against China.