It is commonplace for conservatives to blame Biden for all the conflicts going on in the world. Mike Pompeo and Nikki Haley both repeatedly have tweeted this assertion, and they are far from alone. The argument is that Biden is weak and has made America weak. As a result, bad actors from Venezuela to Azerbaijan have been willing to set fires because they are confident they can get away with it. Are they right?
To agree with their arguments, one must make a few assumptions.
American power and influence are such that what we do and say matters in the calculous of the arsonists in question.
Biden’s actions have communicated weakness.
Biden’s actions have figured into bad actors’ thinking.
Are these assumptions true?
Let’s say for the sake of discussion that they are right that bad actors consider America weak, and this perception has encouraged their actions. Is Biden, who has been in office for three years, responsible for that? Or, might it be the case that he has not changed perceptions of American weakness one way or another? Perhaps the idea was already in place, and Biden’s mistake is not giving them cause to revisit their views? Or, did Trump really stand out and communicate strength, as conservatives like to think Presidents Reagan and perhaps Presidents George H.W. and W. Bush did, giving America an advantage that Biden has blown?
There is no way of knowing, empirically speaking, if the bad actors in question perceive America as weak, do so because of Biden’s handling of American foreign policy, and have factored that perception into their decision-making. We cannot know unless and until one can access sources that shed light on what the bad actors thought and their decision-making process. Did they ask themselves or others what America might do? Were they concerned with the answer to that question? It is entirely possible that they did not or were not.
A counter-argument might be that this precisely is the problem: That they are not concerned, but they should have been. They should be afraid of us and thus should factor our possible reaction into their risk calculus. Maybe.
However, Americans like to think of themselves as being at the center of the world. This can be dangerously misleading. Many world leaders are entangled in purely local political conflicts that have nothing to do with the United States. There is no intrinsic reason for them to think of the United States, just as there is no intrinsic reason for Americans to think about them. The disregard often is mutual. This phenomenon is long-standing. Indeed, many of the conflicts in question have been decades if not centuries in the making, suggesting that something so immediate as three years of American foreign policy is unlikely to matter one way or another. Moreover, is it in America’s interest to be a global policeman? What precisely can the United States even do when it comes to intractable conflicts? Imperial overreach is a real danger.
There is something to be said about the idea of “peace through strength,” however Orwellian that might sound. I also believe that this is particularly relevant to countries with whom there have been long-standing tensions with the United States, namely, Iran. But America has consistently shown weakness ever since Iran’s Islamic Revolution, i.e. well before Joe Biden became president. Iran overran our Embassy and took the Embassy staff hostage. We did nothing. Not long after, Iran bombed our Beirut Embassy (twice) and our Marine barracks, along with that of our ally, France. We sold them weapons. The weakness, in other words, dates to Carter and Reagan and has been continued by every president since. I’ve long believed that an immediate forceful and, yes, violent, response to these events would have had a positive effect. It would have spared us decades of subsequent problems. Alas. Reagan, so lionized by conservatives, flirted with action against Iran when his Administration was not selling it weapons. But that’s all he did. When Reagan did “man up,” he did so to beat up tiny Grenada. George W. Bush condemned Iran as part of an axis of evil but then proceeded to hand it Iraq on a silver platter. He launched a war in Afghanistan to take down Al Qaeda but refused seriously to pressure Pakistan into reining in the Taliban or giving up Bin Laden or Mullah Omar. Maybe he looked into Musharraf’s eyes and saw Roy Rogers. (And of course, Russia’s invasion of Georgia happened under Bush’s watch.)
Biden’s policies have been no worse. In fact, they have been entirely consistent with U.S. foreign policy. This suggests that the problem is not Biden per se but American policy in aggregate. It is as if there is a structural problem, perhaps a problem with American strategic culture. That’s a subject for another day.
As for Trump, beyond killing Qasem Soleimani, which I applaud, what did he do? He called off a retaliatory strike in response to Iran’s downing of a U.S. drone, and I heard from credible sources he did so at the very last minute for no better reason than that he was watching Hannity on Fox, who prompted him to have second thoughts. I’d argue that Trump communicated not strength but capriciousness, which admittedly is in and of itself scary and has a real deterrence value. It was his unpredictability that made him dangerous. But what was Iran’s response? Did Iran act with more circumspection while Trump was in office? Did it restrain Hamas from carrying out a 7 October, only to give Hamas a green light because of Biden? Maybe, but where’s the evidence? The same can be said for Trump’s handling of China, North Korea, and Russia. As enamored as he seems to be of those countries’ tyrants, I don’t see him as firm but rather dangerously unpredictable. Did that dissuade Putin from launching his big invasion of Ukraine while Trump was in office? Possibly, but there is no evidence. We’re dealing with counterfactual arguments.
The one decision by Biden that conservatives point to as a fatal mistake was his decision to withdraw from Afghanistan. According to them, this communicated weakness and signaled America’s willingness to abandon its friends and allies. This is possible, although the decision also bespeaks political courage on Biden’s part, as well as an interest in being better able to focus on more vital American interests. This is not the same thing as weakness. Biden, by the way, never believed in the Afghanistan war. His decision was not the result of something he saw on Fox. In addition, the American presence in Afghanistan exposed us to Iranian machinations, just as our current presence in Iraq does. Iran could dial violence against American and other NATO forces in Afghanistan up and down at will. And, after all, it was Trump who set the Taliban’s victory in motion through his “peace” negotiations with them, which everyone knew but would not admit would lead to Afghanistan’s fall the way U.S. peace talks with North Vietnam paved the way for South Vietnam’s fall.
Biden cannot be blamed for the current conflicts taking place in so many disparate locations. That said, the time has come for the U.S. to shed its long-standing shyness, and its Boy Scout approach to international relations. Many critics are right to point his finger at the State Department, which often appears to be living in an alternate reality in which sternly worded démarches have real results. In the real world, there is a place for diplomacy, but in many cases what counts is the credible threat of violence. This is not, however, a new problem. The State Department’s approach has been remarkably consistent for many decades. This does not mean America should step into every conflict the world over. It absolutely does not mean America should threaten violence everywhere and for every conflict. It does mean, however, that we need to ensure that Russia and China at least are wary of us. And it is high time we gave Iran cause to be afraid.
With regard to Iran:
Persians make up a small majority in Iran. There can be several brushfires lit beneath them. There are Arabs in the southwest oil producing region. There are Kurds, Azeri Turks, and Armenians in the northwest oil producing region. Most concerning to the regime are the Balochs in the southeast. Iran and Pakistan have cooperated to suppress the Balochs. Perhaps the Baluchistan provinces should be combined into a new country. However, State and CIA would have to follow though and not promise but not deliver. CW