It’s time to end the Gaza War
I’ve frequently and loudly expressed the belief that Israel can and should defeat Hamas in Gaza. The problem is not that Hamas can’t be defeated, it’s that thus far, after all this time, I’ve seen no evidence that Israel wants to defeat Hamas. In fact, I’ve yet to figure out what Israel’s leadership wants to achieve beyond degrading Hamas, which is not the same thing. Therefore, presently the war appears pointless, and wars should never be pointless.
What defeating Hamas would require
What should have happened in the first six months of the war was an all-out effort to conquer and occupy Gaza, accompanied or succeeded by an effort to replace Hamas with something else, anything else. This means amassing the manpower to hold territory rather than just clear it. This means either working with Palestinians—or someone, anyone—to establish some sort of authority and governance. Or imposing an occupation authority in the true sense of the term. I also strongly believe Gazan civilians should have been moved into refugee camps, where they could be safe. That seemed never to have been on the table, for various reasons.
Not what Clausewitz had in mind.
What Israel has been doing
Instead, we have seen repeated clearing operations that mostly have allowed Hamas to survive and move around, while civilians have been asked to move repeatedly back and forth. Israeli troops keep returning to the same locations. They keep clearing the same territory. But they never have attempted to hold the territory they cleared. Moreover, there is no sign of any effort to empower any Palestinians to rule, other than some belated flirtation with clan militias. I’m not opposed to using clan militias, but it would only make sense as part of a concerted effort to empower them and build with them any kind of authority. That appears not to have happened or to be happening.
Why Israel is not fighting to win
Here we enter the realm of speculation, although hopefully speculation informed by my own observations and knowledge of Israeli politics.
There is a cynical view that the reason for Israel’s strategy or lack thereof is that Netanyahu merely wishes to avoid indictment and perhaps imprisonment. Netanyahu, the theory goes, fears ending the war, because once the state of emergency that began on 7 October ends, he will become vulnerable. I don’t share these beliefs. A better theory is not that Netanyahu’s trying to avoid jail, but that he is grappling with a fragile political coalition that neither allows him to pursue real victory nor end the war. The contradictions within his coalition also make it impossible for him decisively to choose between the contradictory imperatives of prioritizing fighting and securing the release of hostages. In effect, its politics that prevents Netanyahu from acting decisively one way or another.
But there’s more.
It is now very clear that Israel before 7 October and for at least a year after discounted the threat posed by Hamas out of concern that the real threat was Hezbollah and Iran. Thus, the Israeli military in fact held back in anticipation of having to invade Lebanon. It was not willing to make Gaza a priority. This in fact goes a long way to explain why 7 October could happen in the first place: Israel wasn’t paying attention. All of its focus was on Lebanon and Iran. Evidence can be seen in Israel’s masterful exploitation of extraordinarily good intelligence in Lebanon and Iran, which enabled it to wreak havoc on Hezbollah and Iran’s ability to harm Israel. In the meantime, Hamas was busy sharpening its knives and preparing for 7 October. Israel not only neglected monitoring Hamas , but it also seems not to have had any contingency plans for invading Gaza and taking out Hamas. It had plans for Hezbollah and Iran, as we now know, but not Gaza and Hamas. Even after 7 October, Israel never really changed its focus. Hezbollah always was the more dangerous foe. It read Iran as the real actor behind Hamas.
Another reason is the ruling coalition’s unwillingness to do anything that might strengthen the Palestinian Authority. The Israeli Right appears to fear the Palestinian Authority more than Hamas because of its dread of a two-state solution, something a vital Palestinian Authority would make more feasible. I get this: Israelis have good reason to distrust the Palestinian Authority and its purported commitment to peaceful coexistence. Still, I regard the Palestinian Authority as by far the lesser evil, and the risk inherent to Palestinian statehood less than the risk inherent to allowing Gaza to fester under Hamas rule and possibly see the West Bank slide into Hamas’s orbit. To be clear, every move Israel makes involves risk. It’s a matter of calculating the lesser risk.
What About Trump’s Plan?
Trump’s plan made matters worse by comforting some Israelis with the idea that somehow America would take Gaza off its hands and solve Israel’s problems for them. It encouraged inaction rather than action. The idea of displacing Gazans of course pleases many in Israel, and it makes more sense than most acknowledge. I realize that displacing people now is dubbed “ethnic cleansing” and regarded as a cardinal sin, however I do not see how it is in Gazans’ best interest to be forced to stay in a horrible and dangerous place, and I find it bizarre that no one, most of all fellow Arab countries, is willing to admit them, except for those who apparently have been able to bribe there way through Egyptian security. The Arab world, Egypt foremost among them, prefers to condemn Gazans to stay put, which in effect is tantamount to perpetuating conflict. Of course, this is also the motive behind Arab countries’ refusal to integrate Palestinian refugees, and the UN-backed conspiracy to keep Palestinians permanently in “refugee” state: To keep open the wounds of 1947-1947. I also do not understand why Israelis are expected to put up with neighbors clearly intent on killing them. Regardless, no one is admitting Gazans, and no one really is prepared to take it upon themselves to drive them out. How would one do that, anyway? Perhaps misery will do the job, but with no exit, it’s a terrible idea. Is that Israeli policy? I don’t think so. I believe what we are seeing is the absence of policy. It’s political paralysis.
Israel could still turn the war around and pursue real victory. The destruction of Hezbollah and the weakening of Iran mean the IDF could, finally, mount the kind of campaign victory would require, without fear of having to deal with other fronts. But it won’t, and it won’t because Israel’s leadership does not have the ability to decide on a clear course of action and put it into effect. It appears stuck.
The Algeria Comparison
I normally am hostile to comparisons of Israel/Palestine with France/Algeria, because Israel is not France; its presence in the former British mandate of Palestine is in no way analogous to France’s presence in Algeria. Except in one important way: The French Fourth Republic lacked the ability to act decisively one way or another regarding Algeria. It was too politically weak, and the Algeria question forced one cabinet after another to fall. It took someone with the stature of Charles de Gaulle to break the impasse. I really do not think any French politician other than him could have done it. And even then, he was the target of a coup attempt. Netanyahu is many things, but he certainly is not Charles de Gaulle, and Israel’s bizarre coalition politics make the French Fourth Republic look like a paragon of stability. There also is this reality: Leaving Algeria was humiliating for France, but Algeria’s revolutionaries in no way threatened France itself, which by the way was on the other side of the Mediterranean. France risked nothing beyond a tremendous blow to its self-image. In contrast, all of Israel’s choices are extraordinarily risky. Making any decisive move would require a measure of courage that none among Israel’s current political class possesses. It also \would require the Israeli public to gamble with its very safety. It’s not about prestige or self-image, but staying alive. No pressure.