Root Causes and Responsibility

When assessing conflicts ranging from Gaza to insurgencies everywhere, observers often are torn between two extremes. One is a deterministic focus on “root causes” and the belief that they alone are responsible for conflict. Therefore, the only plausible response to a conflict is to address root causes. The clear implication of this is to absolve any of the actors of any responsibility. It’s not a terrorist’s fault they’ve taken to terrorism. The other is to deny categorically the relevance of root causes and focus on the responsibility of the actors. Never mind history, or how miserable or mistreated a person might be. Acts of violence are inexcusable. This take absolves anyone else of responsibility.

It’s not their fault. Or is it?

I wrestle with this dilemma all the time. In my writing about Gaza and Israel/Palestine, I tend to stress the responsibility of Palestinians and their choices. I insist on recognizing Palestinian agency, rather than write Palestinians’ acts of violence off as an “understandable” response to root causes, specifically the actions of Israel or anyone else. Yet at the same time, when writing about terrorism and insurgencies in West Africa, as I did in my recent video on Fulanis and jihad in the Sahel, I’m quick to point to root causes. Some of the comments in response to the video accused me of justifying or apologizing for acts of violence committed by Fulanis. Am I contradicting myself?

Without wishing to enter into a lengthy comparison of the situations in Gaza and West Africa, I think it more useful to try to identify some sort of happy medium between the two positions and perhaps suggest guidelines for what might be described as an analytical best practice.

Philosophically speaking, determinism of any sort is bad and, in most cases, intellectually lazy. Humans have agency. They can make choices. No one responds mechanically to a given set of conditions; becoming a terrorist or massacring villagers is not an automatic response to external stimuli such as what happens when a doctor strikes one’s knee to test one’s reflex. Rather, no one should, given that we are endowed with a consciousness, the ability to reason, and some imperative for ethical thinking. Moreover, I don’t think it correct to absolve people of responsibility. Maybe a murderer had a terrible childhood and was beaten by his parents, but he should still go to prison.

On the other hand, it is equally wrong to deny the importance of context or external factors. In armed conflicts, there often is plenty of blame to go around, and it would be dishonest to disregard the evidence implicating any of the actors. I also think it helpful to understand the range of options available to people, for whatever reason. For some people, committing acts of violence makes sense. Understanding why—without absolving anyone of responsibility for their choices—is helpful, especially if one is interested in finding long-term solutions to conflicts.

By way of an example, maybe ten years ago I spoke to a gathering of Malian expatriates in Washington about the conflict in northern Mali and the history of Tuareg uprisings. The first of those was in 1963, and I mentioned that it was precipitated in part by Malian government policy that was hostile to some Tuareg communities. I argued that Malian government responses to that first Tuareg rebellion (massacre and collective punishment) only sowed the seeds for future rebellions rather than improve relations with the Tuareg minority and foster reconciliation between it and the Malian state. Moreover, the Malian state’s conduct toward many Tuareg communities during subsequent decades likewise just made things worse.

Present at that meeting was Mali’s Ambassador to the United States, who took objection to what I said. He made the following argument: “The first rebellion took place in 1963, just three years after Mali became independent from France. There is no way the state could have done anything in so short a period of time that might have justified rebellion.” This statement of course is false, given the reality of Malian government policies at the time, which absolutely were hostile to Tuareg interests. But it gets worse. The Ambassador argued that the Malian state had and has no responsibility for the Tuareg uprisings, for what even are Tuaregs? Tuaregs, he explained, are Berbers, and if you look everywhere in the region and in North Africa, one finds that Berbers are a problem. Thus, Malian Tuaregs are the problem, not Mali’s treatment of them, and they are a problem because they are Berbers. So, the Tuareg problem has nothing to do with Mali. Mali is blameless.

The Ambassador was doing two things. First, the was placing all the responsibility for Tuareg insurgencies on Tuaregs themselves rather than entertain the possibility that maybe just maybe the Malian state bore some responsibility. Second, he was engaged in a different form of determinism, in this case racial. As it happened, there were some Tuareg women sitting behind me at the event, and I could tell from their murmurings during the Ambassador’s address that they were furious. Rightfully so, I think. As I see it, while it is true that ultimately Tuaregs are responsible for rebellions that frankly have done them no good, it is ignorant to absolve anyone else of any responsibility. This matters, I believe, if one wants to forge a long-term solution to Mali’s ever-simmering conflict with certain Tuareg communities. They have legitimate complaints which perhaps Mali’s government and the rest of Mali’s population should consider, rather than simply fighting Tuaregs, which has not worked and never will. Mali cannot craft an effective policy toward Tuaregs if it continues to deny and responsibility for poor relations with them and shrug of their complaints.

This brings us to Fulanis. Those who take up arms must be fought. I do not object to African security services fighting them. On the contrary, I would not hesitate to work with African security services to help them do this, as I have in fact done in the past. The problem comes when one 1) assumes fighting alone will solve the problem, and 2) when one deals with the problem by massacring Fulani communities. Besides, African states often lack the capacity to pull off a military-only strategy. Their forces are too small; the territory concerned too vast. I would have African states pair military action with earnest efforts to figure out why so many Fulani take to armed jihad. One advantage of this approach would be to strengthen relations between the state and the majority of Fulanis who want nothing to do with jihad and are caught between the jihadists and state security services. I would have West African states work harder to get that non-violent majority on side.

As for Gaza, as much of a hawk as I am, I cannot ignore or disregard Palestinians’ grievances against Israel. I believe many of them legitimate. That said, I cannot absolve them of repeatedly choosing violence rather than state building, and there is no denying the fact that Hamas is a death cult that would gladly see Gaza in ruins and Gazan babies in shrouds if it makes Israel look bad. I cannot forgive October 7 and write it off by arguing that “well, what do you expect given Netanyahu’s policies” or some such thing. I hear this argument all the time. Sorry. We’re back in the territory of justifying a mass murderer because of his or her horrible childhood. I also struggle with the view that Gazans themselves are innocent of Hamas’s actions. Hamas is not a foreign entity that has acted in isolation from and without the active collaboration or complicity of large numbers of Gazans, not to mention the collaboration or complicity of the United Nations and major international aid organizations.

The root cause argument comes into play when thinking about long-term solutions for Israel-Palestine, and also for trying to keep the West Bank from becoming another Gaza. I believe Israel can and should destroy Hamas on the ground in Gaza, but any resulting peace will prove short-lived if there is not an earnest effort to address Palestinians’ legitimate grievances. Some might argue that is impossible. My counter to that is that one must try.