Ukraine, Nukes, and the Plausibility of a War with Russia
Ukraine, Nukes, and the Plausibility of a War with Russia
Ukraine hawks—and I guess I must include myself in that category—warn that if the West does not deal firmly with Russia and instead allows it to impose its will on Ukraine, Putin sooner or later will turn his attention to the rest of the former Soviet Empire that now is part of NATO. Others warn that being too firm with Russia carries the risk of escalation, which implies a broader war involving other countries. As if that were not bad enough, such a war could even lead to the use of nuclear weapons. Yes, nukes are still a thing.
But is a war involving NATO members with Russia plausible? For one thing, the fact that Russia’s military is being so badly mauled by Ukraine means that it would not stand a chance against NATO’s military might. Finland and soon Poland alone could cut the Russians to pieces. (I recently made a video about the Polish military here.) Surely Putin understands this, even if he badly underestimated the Ukrainians. And then there’s the question of nuclear weapons. Russia still has them, as do the United States, Britain, and France. In the 79 years since their invention, nuclear weapons have helped prevent a direct confrontation between the United States and its allies on one side and the Russians and their satellites on the other. Surely nuclear deterrence still works its magic?
I’ve been reading a lot of Cold War-era French nuclear deterrence theory lately (as one does), and found some things that apply equally well to today. Theorists such as Generals Charles Ailleret, André Beaufre, Pierre Gallois, and Lucien Poirier (sometimes referred to in France as the “four generals of the apocalypse”) as well as the philosopher Raymond Aron all took very seriously in the question of whether a war with the Soviet Union was plausible. They understood that nuclear deterrence made some wars highly unlikely and perhaps impossible. That said, they also believed that nuclear deterrence did not make impossible all types of armed conflict. But where was the border between the plausible and the implausible? Could there still be room for limited and conventional wars in Europe between the two blocks? Could such things take place and not trigger nuclear war? Could escalation be managed? Also, when push came to shove, would nuclear powers use their nuclear weapons? How plausible, really, was the threat of using nukes for any but the most of dire circumstances?
The French Cold War theorists disagreed about many things but agreed on some basic ideas. The first was that nuclear weapons made it highly unlikely that the Soviets would attempt a massive all out-attack on NATO, with or without a nuclear first strike intended to cripple NATO defenses. What worried them was that they believed it was only nuclear deterrence that made a full-blown invasion implausible. Without them…or without the certainty that they would be used…the Soviets might be tempted, because NATO’s conventional military strength alone was not enough to stand up to the full weight of the Soviet military and the Warsaw Pact. Nonetheless, the Soviets would be gambling. Maybe the US, Britain, or France would not use its nuclear weapons. Maybe they would.
What was far more plausible in the French theorists’ eyes was the possibility of what Beaufre referred to as the “artichoke maneuver.” The idea was that instead of a full-blown attack, one attempts to eat away at one’s adversary by grabbing small pieces, with each act of aggression calculated to remain below the threshold of what might trigger a full-blown war. Beaufre’s examples were from the 1930s, when Nazi Germany grabbed up pieces of land (the Rhineland, Czechoslovakia, and Austria), guessing correctly that Britain and France would not respond. As Beaufre noted, Hitler was careful to act quickly, so that he could present the Western Powers with a fait accompli before they had time to register what was going on and respond appropriately.
One eats an artichoke one leaf at a time.
Tied to this view was concern that what the Soviets might do was exploit divisions among the allies, and leverage Leftist groups that existed in NATO countries that tended to undermine anti-Soviet resolve. Without resolve, and riven by dissensions, making off with bits and pieces of territory or otherwise acting to obtain favorable political objectives was plausible.
If anything, nuclear deterrence made the above scenarios more rather than less likely. Before nuclear weapons, wars were known to be started for reasons that nowadays would seem slight or of no great consequence. All it took was for one side to estimate that it was strong enough to have a chance of winning, and a reason to see something the other did as contrary to its interests. Nuclear weapons, however, mean that nuclear armed countries are far less prone to react to “incidents” with violence. They are far more likely to shrug something off or accept that there was nothing they reasonably could do about an act of aggression, so long as that act did not jeopardize a vital interest. The stakes must be very high indeed to go to war when war might result in nuclear detonations. Aggressive countries, and the French theorists certainly regarded the Soviet Union as such, could be counted upon to take advantage of their adversaries’ reticence and test to see precisely how much they could get away with.
Regarding Ukraine, it seems unlikely that Western measures in support of Ukraine might lead to an escalation that would result in a full-blown war between NATO and Russia. The combination of nuclear weapons and NATO’s conventional military power compared to Russia’s ensures a big war will not happen.
But the scenarios mentioned above are entirely plausible: Small aggressions calculated not to trigger war, combined with clandestine efforts to divide opinion within NATO and exploit differences of opinion among NATO states, are real risks. Indeed, Russia already is doing this. The more divided we are, the more assertive Russia will become. The more disinterested the United States is, the more assertive Russia will become.
I worry that if Trump abandons Ukraine to its fate, in a move worthy of Chamberlain, Russia will find Western weakness encouraging. Moreover, the less the US asserts its leadership within the Alliance, the more other Alliance members will try to assert their own. This will include the usual suspects: Britain, France, and Germany, to be joined by Poland because it is on a path to have NATO’s largest and most capable army. None of these, however, can readily replace American leadership. With each new crisis, they will try to pull the consensus within NATO in different directions. Poland will want to take a hard line. Germany will want to prevaricate. Britain and France will fall somewhere in the middle, as well the rest of NATO. The daylight between their positions will create openings in which Russia will insert wedges. Russia will feed off of any disunity that results, making future wars more likely.
Want to read a great book about Finland’s wars with the Soviet Union? Check out this book, perhaps the best war novel you’ve probably never heard of: Unknown Soldiers.